November 2007: Climate change, ICT and scenario planning

Writers and commentators about climate change talk a lot about planning and preparing for the future. Curiously, they rarely make reference to scenario planning, the project management technique which encourages planners to consider multiple possible futures. This is odd, because there is no shortage of uncertainties in the climate change arena. In this article, Jeremy Green takes up the challenge.

Axes of uncertainty

Most practical exercises in scenario planning wallow in multiple contingencies for a while and then end up by defining two major axes of uncertainty about the future; overlaying these produces the two-by-two matrix beloved of management consultants everywhere, thereby generating four possible scenarios.

In terms of climate change the two major axes of uncertainty are:

- how profound the physical impact of climate change is going to be, and; 
- how resilient our civilisation turns out to be.

The first of these is easy to characterise – though of course, not easy to resolve. We sort of know that climate change is going to be bad, but we don't know how bad. Although the individual disciplines that make up climate study are exact sciences, they are dealing with many systems,all involved in a complex series of interactions. New elements are being folded in to the overall equation all the time; for example, the albedo effect, whereby the earth's ice caps have hitherto played an important role in preventing warming because they reflect heat back into space, is a relatively recent discovery.

Other aspects of the equation are not just unknown but are also much harder to know – for example, the impact that Peak Oil will have on climate change. It's possible to believe that the decline in oil production might reduce our overall production of greenhouse gases; but it's equally possible that we'll make up the energy deficit by burning more damaging hydrocarbons such as coal.

The second uncertainty is also fairly straightforward to describe. As a civilisation we might respond rapidly and sensibly to the threat which climate change poses, and we might not. There are lots of examples of civilisations which failed when confronted with environmental challenges. Jared Diamond's book, Collapse, provides some compelling examples of this, and should help to dispel the notion that 'someone will sort it out once it gets bad enough'. If climate science sometimes seems uncertain, social science is much more so. There are some signs that we are preparing to respond – certainly climate change is on just about every political agenda, across the political spectrum. But equally, there is evidence that though we are talking a lot, we are not doing much – we are continuing to build roads and airports and fossil-fueled power stations.

The Matrix: from “Ecotoptia” to “Apocalypse Soon”

Taken together, our two uncertainties provide a classic scenario-planning two-by-two matrix, with four possible futures. These are illustrated on the diagram below. I've called them 'Ecotopia', 'Stalinism Nouveau', 'Dystopian Collapse' and 'Apocalypse Soon'.

Ecotopia is the scenario which seems to inform much current planning and talking about climate change. We start preparing soon, and a combination of technology advances and prudent regulation will be enough to take us through a gentle energy descent with a soft landing. Our way of life doesn't have to change much. Here we are all going to have make a few sacrifices, We turn down the central heating and wear jumpers indoors, we swap out our light bulbs, buy newer green cars, and carry on much as before.

Stalinism Nouveau is what will be needed if climate change (and peak oil) turn out to hit harder. Here we'll have to move rapidly to a much more regulated society. We'll need strictly enforced rationing. This could be done through the market, with tradeable allowances making it possible for those with plenty of money to hang on to more of their life-styles; or could be done with more equality and fairness, and less 'freedom'. Either way is going to need some fairly heavy repression to ensure that people put up with the inevitable rapid reduction in their standard of living. If we are lucky it might be a bit like 1940s Britain, with ration books (electronic, of course), queues and shortages, but a jolly 'all in it together' sort of atmosphere. If we're less lucky it might be more like Stalinism classic, or Apartheid South Africa.

Dystopian Collapse is the consequence of 'business as usual' against the background of a relatively mild shift in climate. The landscape will change. Food production will decline, so prices will go up and availability will reduce. That's mildly unpleasant for the developed world, and much nastier in the developing world. Economic recession is a given, as there's less to spend on non-food items. Insurance costs will rise, 'freak' weather will become the norm, and taxes will increase to cope with the more frequent emergencies.

Apocalypse Soon is the full melt-down scenario. Sea levels rise, rivers dry up, food production falls. Methane bubbles out of the oceans, causing tidal waves and potentially, earthquakes. Billions of people starve to death and die in related epidemics, millions migrate. Wars for resources, mass extinctions of many species of animals and perhaps plants. Human life will continue, but ultimately on a much smaller scale, and with much less technological and cultural sophistication. The survivors may envy the dead; either way, life will certainly be nasty, brutish and short.

It would be tempting to order these four scenarios as running from best case to worst case, but that's not how scenario planning is supposed to work. After all, the point is that the two axes of uncertainty are...well, uncertain. We don't know that the less happy end of the axis is less likely; doing scenario planning properly means treating all four scenarios as equally likely.

ICT and the four scenarios

So how can the ICT industry plan for the four scenarios? Well, callous as it may sound, three of the four present obvious business opportunities.

Ecotopia will drive the kinds of planning already going on the industry, for low-energy products and for those that will help other industries to save carbon – fleet management systems, for example.

Stalinism Noveau will require every bit of effort to save carbon, but it will also create opportunities in rationing and enforcement. Rationing itself is unlikely to involve square carboard coupons; it will be based on electronic communications and storage, so providing lots of opportunities for ICT investment. And if the 'war on terror' and homeland security has proved something of a bonanza for the ICT industry, just think what will be needed to equip the police forces needed to preside over a rapid reduction in living standards. If we need more police to protect huge cash-based disparities in carbon allocations, or to track down rationing cheats, that's even more kit. Think TETRA2, think eavesdropping, think surveillance and tagging and biometrics and...

Even Dystopian collapse presents some opportunities. The long slow slide into permanent recession will need managing, and there will be a good market for military technologies to help in all those resource wars. The ARPAnet, the predecessor of today's internet, was built partly in response to a perceived need for a self-healing, self-defending network that could survive a nuclear catastrophe; so planning for a painful transition to a low-carbon society should give quite a stimulus for the development of robust, decentralised networking technologies.

Only Apocalypse Now really presents a commercial dead end. It's hard to see where are the opportunities in this one – even if small bands of survivors wanted to buy kit to use in the shattered remnants of civilisation, they won't have any acceptable currencies with which to pay for it. And even if they had, workable business models and channels to market will be very hard to organise. All in all, then, the ICT industries should do their best to make sure that this one doesn't happen.